Using Contextual Information to Improve Phishing Warning Effectiveness by Sharma, Satyabrata (Author) et al.
Using Contextual Information to Improve Phishing Warning Effectiveness
by
Satyabrata Sharma
A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirement for the Degree
Master of Science
Approved April 2015 by the
Graduate Supervisory Committee:
Rida Bazzi, Chair
Erin Walker
Ashraf Gaffar
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
May 2015
ABSTRACT
Internet browsers are today capable of warning internet users of a potential phishing
attack. Browsers identify these websites by referring to blacklists of reported phishing
websites maintained by trusted organizations like Google, Phishtank etc. On identi-
fying a Unified Resource Locator (URL) requested by a user as a reported phishing
URL, browsers like Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome display an ‘active’ warning
message in an attempt to stop the user from making a potentially dangerous decision
of visiting the website and sharing confidential information like username-password,
credit card information, social security number etc.
However, these warnings are not always successful at safeguarding the user from a
phishing attack. On several occasions, users ignore these warnings and ‘click through’
them, eventually landing at the potentially dangerous website and giving away confi-
dential information. Failure to understand the warning, failure to differentiate differ-
ent types of browser warnings, diminishing trust on browser warnings due to repeated
encounter are some of the reasons that make users ignore these warnings. It is impor-
tant to address these factors in order to eventually improve a users reaction to these
warnings.
In this thesis, I propose a novel design to improve the effectiveness and reliability
of phishing warning messages. This design utilizes the name of the target website
that a fake website is mimicking, to display a simple, easy to understand and inter-
active warning message with the primary objective of keeping the user away from a
potentially spoof website.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
With growing number of internet users around the world, the attack plane for mali-
cious attackers is getting bigger and it is a constant challenge for the security commu-
nity to device methods to foil the various types of attacks used to steal private and
confidential information from people. Today, it is widely recognized that the security
and privacy of a system is not entirely dependent on technology. Consideration of
human factors is an important part of any security system design. This idea revolves
around the fact that a system can have users of different backgrounds and technical
prowess and thus the ‘usability’ of the system is a high priority requirement today.
Usability is defined as “the extent to which a product can be used by specified users
to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in a specified
context of use” (ISO 9241). The ease with which a user learns how to use a system,
the rate at which she makes errors while using it, the ease with which she can retain
the knowledge attained by previous usage of it, the satisfaction of using it, are some
factors that constitute the usability of a system Garfinkel and Lipford (2014). Us-
ability has become a requirement that needs attention throughout the development
cycle of a system rather than at the end. In developing security systems too, usable
privacy and security (UPS) has become a high priority requirement. To make security
effective, security mechanisms should be usable by all types of people using a system,
ranging from non-technical users to experts. Without usable security, the user is more
likely to become vulnerable and get compromised by an attacker.
To protect a user from possible threats, many security mechanisms have been de-
veloped. Browser warning is one such mechanism, which is incorporated in today’s
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browsers to protect an internet user from threats like identity theft, theft of confiden-
tial information, exposure to malware etc. Organizations like Google and Phishtank
maintain blacklists of reported phishing and malware websites. To protect a user from
these websites, browsers use these lists and check every URL being requested by the
user against them. For every URL that is found in these lists, the browser presents
a warning message to the user about the potentially malicious website. The warn-
ings give users the option to either stop from proceeding or ignore and bypass them.
These warnings are intended to protect the users from malicious websites but studies
have shown that these warnings are not very effective in stopping users from visiting
potentially dangerous websites. Users have been observed to ignore browser warnings
fairly regularly Dhamija et al. (2006) as heeding a warning involves spending time
reading and understanding it, which deviates from their original task. Commonly,
users get habituated to browser warnings and this too leads to users not taking the
warnings seriously Bravo-Lillo et al. (2013), Bravo-Lillo et al. (2014). A well-known
epigram to succinctly describe this observed behavior of users goes as follows: given
a choice between dancing pigs and security, users will pick dancing pigs every time
McGraw et al. (1999)m. Thus, there is a need to make users understand warnings
better and help them heed them.
1.1 Motivation
With browser warnings, including phishing warnings, it is desired that every time
a warning is displayed to an internet user who is trying to visit a certain website, the
user heeds the warning message and refrains from visiting the potentially malicious
website. Exception to this are cases where the user is working under a controlled and
safe environment, or the requested website has been incorrectly tagged as a malicious
website and the user is absolutely certain about it. But current browser warnings
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are not able to achieve this near 100% success rate. At an average, about 20% of
the Internet users that encounter a phishing warning message, are found to click-
through to the spoof website Symantec (2013). Other warning messages face similar
rates of ‘ignorance’, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Thus, as mentioned
earlier, there is a need to design better warning messages that can improve the users
understanding of the warning and the threats associated, and also the users adherence
to the warnings.
1.2 Thesis
This thesis work focuses on phishing attack warnings and their effectiveness. The
goal of this work is to understand how users’ reactions to phishing warnings can be
improved so that they are more likely to make safe decisions. An important factor
that impacts a user’s reaction to a warning message is its reliability. If a user does not
trust the accuracy or seriousness of a warning message, she is more likely to ignore it,
rather than heed it. So part of this study is to develop a warning message mechanism
that users can trust. The new mechanism ensures that a user is warned of a security
threat not only when she is trying to visit a potentially dangerous website but also
when she has visited the page and the page is still loaded in the browser. The warning
is displayed unless the user chooses to discard the warning permanently. There are
multiple stages of the warning message. In the first three stages, the warning tries
to keep the user away from a fake website by utilizing the information of the target
website. The final stage comes into picture when the user ignores the earlier stages
and moves on visit the phishing website. In this stage, the warning tries to stop the
user from entering confidential information into this website. There is an associated
assumption that the designed warning mechanism needs to be accepted as a genuine
browser warning, like existing warnings displayed by browsers like Mozilla Firefox,
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Google Chrome, Safari etc. The objective is to design a warning message that gives
better user understanding and thus better user response, with the assumption that
user recognizes the warning as a genuine browser warning. Ways of making a user
recognize a warning message as a genuine browser warning and not a fake warning
message, targeted at the user, is outside the scope of this study.
The remaining of the thesis is divided as follows: Chapter 2 discusses warning
literature and previous work done in the development of warning messages, Chapter 3
talks more about using target information in a phishing warning message, its technical
feasibility and usability issues, Chapter 4 discusses the experiment conducted and the
results and chapter 5 concludes this report with suggestions for future work.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORK: WARNING LITERATURE
Web browsers today show warnings to users in the event of a possible attack. These
warnings have been studied by various research groups. Studies have covered all
types of browser warnings, like malicious website warning, phishing warnings, SS-
L/TLS warnings and their various aspects. Research work on warning studied the
effectiveness of existing warnings Almuhimedi et al. (2014), Vance et al. (2014), Egel-
man et al. (2008), Akhawe and Felt (2013), the factors that lead to users ignoring
these warnings Almuhimedi et al. (2014), Vance et al. (2014) and ways to improve
these warnings Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011), Bravo-Lillo et al. (2013), Bravo-Lillo et al.
(2014), Felt et al. (2014), Krol et al. (2012). Most studies have concluded that users
are the weakest link of the entire security mechanism. Users often try to get past a
security warning message, when encountering one, as it comes in the way of the task
that is being carried out. Some of the literature and studies that discuss the various
aspects of different browser warnings will be discussed here.
2.1 Warning System
A warning is any kind of message that cautions a person from a potentially un-
desirable situation. Designing an effective warning is a challenging task. Warning
literature has identified various factors that are associated with the effectiveness of a
warning message. Wogalter proposed various guidelines for an effective warning de-
sign Conzola and Wogalter (2001). Some of the important guidelines he identified are
the use of short and familiar words, as little words as possible to convey the message,
pictorial symbol for attracting attention, plain, familiar and non-fancy font for the
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text, etc. He also proposed a conceptual model, Communications Human Informa-
tion Processing (C-HIP) model that divide the warning procedure into the following
phases:
• Attention Switch and Maintenance
• Comprehension
• Attitude Beliefs
• Motivation
If a warning message failed, this model became an effective way to determine the
cause of the failure of the warning. In a separate study, Egelman et al. examined
the effectiveness of active and passive browser warnings by analysing them using the
C-HIP model Egelman et al. (2008). Their study looked at active warnings of Mozilla
Firefox (FF) and Internet Explorer (IE) browsers and passive warnings of IE browser.
With the help of this model, they were able to examine the various points of failure
of the warnings and also helped them make a comparison study of those warning
messages. Passive IE warning was outperformed in every component of the C-HIP
model by the active FF warning. The active IE warning was found to outperform
passive IE warnings in some of the C-HIP components but were not much different
in some others. Overall, this study showed that passive browser warnings were more
or less useless, when it came to warning users of any potential threat, and the C-HIP
model helped in analysing the weaknesses of these warnings.
2.2 Browser Warning Effectiveness
Various studies have focused on determining the effectiveness of browser warnings.
Most studies conclude that internet users mostly ignore browser warnings for a variety
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of reasons, some of which will be discussed in this chapter later. Egelman et al.
conducted a user study with 60 participants in a lab, where they found that about a
fifth of the participants clicked through an active warning message whereas 87% of the
participants clicked through passive warnings Egelman et al. (2008). In another study
conducted to understand the users behavior to browser warning messages, Vance et
al. found that users mostly ignored warning messages unless they fell victim to
some attack and lost something, like data getting deleted from the hard drive by a
virus that got installed after some warning was ignored a the first place Vance et al.
(2014). It was only after facing such a situation, users were found to have heeded more
warning messages. In a 2013 study, Akhawe et al. found that contrary to popular
belief, internet users today are much more aware and heedful of warning messages,
viz. malicious warnings, phishing warnings as well as SSL warnings Akhawe and Felt
(2013). They conducted a study of over 4.5 million users of Google Chrome and
Mozilla Firefox users via telemetry and found that with new browsers and new and
more refined warning messages, the issue of users ignorance of warning messages is a
matter of the past. From the browsing data collected from all these users, the authors
calculated the click through rate (CTR, percentage of users that ignore a warning) for
different types of warnings from both Firefox and Chrome browsers and found that
among Mozilla Firefox users, 7.2% users ignored malware warnings, 9.1% ignored
phishing warnings and 33% ignored SSL warnings. Among Google Chrome warnings,
these numbers were 23.2%, 18% and 70.2% respectively. These numbers suggest that
other than the SSL warnings, browser warnings are not as much ignored by users
now as they were earlier. In addition to that, the study found that more technically
experienced users tend to be more ignorant of the warnings than other users. However,
the causes of this was not studied and has been left open for future research. In 2014,
Almuhimedi et al. conducted a study of malicious warning messages in browsers in
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which they collected about 4 million warning impressions via telemetry. The data
collected by them showed that the CTR for websites that have not been visited before
range between 9.3% and 17.2%, whereas the CTR for websites that have been visited
before range from 15.6% to 54.3%. The limitation here was that browsing history
could be cleared and thus the numbers above can be inaccurate. However, it only
meant that the CTR calculated could be a lower bound on the actual CTR.
These studies indicate that browser warnings in general are not even close to being
100% accurate. For various reasons, users choose to ignore browser warnings and click
through them. The following section talks about some of these reasons.
2.3 Warning Ignorance Factors
Various studies have looked into reasons behind users’ ignorance of browser warn-
ing messages. Of the various reasons found, the most common included users inabil-
ity to understand the message due to its esoteric nature Vance et al. (2014), trust in
‘protective technologies’ like anti-virus software, Linux operating system, Apple Macs
etc. and confusion between different types of warning messages Almuhimedi et al.
(2014). Also, frequent exposure to warning messages causes habituation and users
slowly start ignoring warning messages slowly, over time Bravo-Lillo et al. (2013),
Bravo-Lillo et al. (2014).
In the study conducted by Almuhimedi et al. Almuhimedi et al. (2014), it was
observed that users ignored browser warnings due to the following primary reasons:
• Trust in ‘protective technologies’ like anti-virus software, Linux operating sys-
tems, Apple Macs etc.
• Confusion of malware warnings with SSL warnings, which many users believe
to be mostly false positives.
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• Inability to identify if a link from a referrer is actually of a valid website or a fake
website, in spite of the warning message showing the URL of the destination.
In addition, it was found that some people trusted reputed websites more than the
warnings and thus ignored the warnings, whereas some people would not discard the
warnings outright and spend considerable amount of time to understand the warnings
if they were shown for highly reputed destination. In the study conducted by Vance
et al., it was observed that most participants found the technical language used in the
warnings too difficult to understand and some also reported that the warnings lacked
clarity and were lacking detailed information Vance et al. (2014). It was observed
that once users are afraid of possible consequences of ignoring warning messages, their
responses improved and they started heeding the warnings more. These observations
highlight the importance of keeping warnings simple and easy to understand. The
guidelines proposed by Wogalter can help design a very effective warning message
Conzola and Wogalter (2001).
2.4 Browser Warning Improvement
There has been a great focus on improving warning message effectiveness. Several
studies have focused on new warning designs in an attempt to understand the factors
that make a good, effective warning message. Some of these have focused on browser
warnings and some others have focused on operating system level security dialogs.
Some modified warning designs have been found to be more effective than existing
warnings in various aspects, while some were found to be not as effective. Bravo-Lillo
et al. conducted a study in which they looked into the relation between a warning
design, the users understanding of the warning, users motivation of choosing the
safest option for a particular warning and the users final reaction to the warning
Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011). They studied four existing computer security warnings and
9
two warnings redesigned for each warning type, categorized under low and high risk
situations. Their design was found to be better than existing warnings at improving
understanding and motivation in some of the cases, but not all. However, there
seemed to be no significant difference in user reaction to warnings in low and high risk
scenarios, where the expected reactions were different. In a follow up study, Bravo-
Lillo et al. designed a set of modified warnings, termed as ‘attractors’, designed to
‘attract’ user attention to a text field within the warning, and improve their responses
Bravo-Lillo et al. (2013). Different types of attractors were designed to capture the
users attention by requiring user action to get past them. There were five types
of ‘inhibitive’ warnings, which were designed to prevent the user from making a
potentially hazardous choice until the user took some expected action, depending
on the type of the attractor used, or some period of time elapsed after the attractor
became visible. Some of the user actions expected included moving the mouse pointer
over some part of the warning text, typing in a text box inside the attractor, clicking
an OK button over some text in the attractor etc. Three ‘static’ attractors were also
designed to attract user attention without the requirement of inhibitive user action.
The authors conducted three between-subjects experiments to test the attractors
effectiveness with 573 Mechanical Turk workers. The study showed improvement
in user reaction to certain attractors, and some insignificant difference in reaction
to certain attractors. However, it was shown that with change in design, it was
possible to get significant improvement in user reaction to warnings. Following up
to this study, Bravo-Lillo et al. conducted another study to improve upon some
of the attractors, discussed earlier, to make them more effective in high as well as
low habituation scenarios Bravo-Lillo et al. (2014). Their experiments in both studies
showed that the warnings which were interactive, i.e. needed user interaction with the
message text, were very effective in improving user reactions and adherence. However,
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this resulted in reduced usability in some of the warnings as users were required to
perform actions like selecting text using the mouse, typing in an input box etc.
In another study, Krol et al. conduct a study with 120 participants who were asked
to download a PDF file in their own laptop Krol et al. (2012). While downloading the
file, the users encounter one of two malware warning messages. It was observed that
out of 120 participants, 98 ignored the warning and went on to download the PDF. Out
of the 22 people who heeded the warning message, 16 were females and 6 were males,
which indicated that females could be more wary of security and privacy threats.
With an eye tracking mechanism, it was observed that on an average, participants
spent about 6 seconds on each warning message, which was enough for them to
read the entire message. Based on this and their responses from a post experiment
survey, it was found that 107 people were able to understand the warning message.
It was also observed, from the survey, that participants with knowledge of computer
security and more technical experience were more ignorant of the warning messages.
This study gives a conclusive account of how users ignore browser warnings, in spite
of understanding them and suggests that users need to be made to understand the
seriousness of warning messages and not take them for granted. In a study focused
on improving Google Chromes SSL warning effectiveness, Felt et al. incorporated
Mozilla Firefox SSL warning design in the Chrome browser Felt et al. (2014). This
study was based on the results from a previous study by Akhawe et al. Akhawe and
Felt (2013) where it was found that Google Chrome SSL warning was ignored by
over 70% of the users who encountered them. In comparison, Firefox SSL warning
was ignored by just 33% of the users who encountered them. On redesigning the
Chrome warning to a ‘Mock Firefox’ design, the CTR was seen to go down to 56%,
which is still a very high number of users ignoring the SSL warning. In an attempt to
make SSL warning more effective, Felt et al. worked on redesigning the Chrome SSL
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warning by following guidelines found in warning literature. They focused on simple,
easy to understand text, without the use of too much technical jargon. They aimed
at improving the users comprehension as well as the understanding of the warning
message. By collecting feedback from over 7500 participants over Google Consumer
Survey (GCS), they found that it was possible to improve users adherence to the
warning, i.e. they were able to stop up to 58.3% users from ignoring the warning.
However, the warning was not able to improve users understanding of the threat
associated with it.
A lot of work has been done to improve the effectiveness of browser warnings and a
lot of success has been achieved. But it has become more challenging to make warning
messages even more effective, in terms of comprehension as well as understanding.
It has been seen that choosing simple and easy to understand message text and an
interactive design can be some of the factors that can make warning messages more
effective.
2.5 Phishing Warnings
Surprisingly, warning study has not been focused much on phishing warnings.
Although there have been a few studies that focused on how users behave to phishing
warning messages, Egelman et al. (2008), Akhawe and Felt (2013) there has been no
study looking into possible ways of improving phishing warning messages. As it was
discussed earlier, Egelman et al. conducted a comparison study of the effectiveness
of active vs. passive phishing warning messages and found that active messages
were much more effective than passive warning messages in protecting a user from
potentially spoof websites. In their large scale study to calculate the CTR of users of
Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome browsers, Akhawe et al. found that about 9% of
Firefox users and 18% of Chrome users ignore the phishing warning to proceed to the
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spoof website and potentially get confidential information stolen. However, beyond
this, there has been no focus on making these warnings more effective. Browser
developers have time and again tried to improve phishing warnings, but this has been
restricted to the look and feel of the warning only. Modifications have been made
to background colors, the warning text, warning images etc. that are used in the
warning. But beyond this, there has been no significant design changes in phishing
warning messages, since active warnings replaced passive warnings.
13
Chapter 3
PHISHING ATTACK: USING TARGET WEBSITE INFORMATION TO
IMPROVE WARNING DESIGN
Earlier it was discussed that to a certain extent, phishing warning messages are in-
effective, as they are either unable to stop users from ‘clicking through’ to a fake
website, or they are unable to improve the users comprehension of the warning. The
comparison of active warnings and passive warnings show that introduction of active
warnings brought down the CTR by a huge margin Egelman et al. (2008). To bring
down this rate further is an even more challenging task. To bring down the CTR to
close to zero, there must be significant improvement in the warning design. But other
than the introduction of active warnings, there has been no revolutionary change in
phishing warning designs. Most of the changes that phishing warnings have under-
gone after active warnings were introduced are with respect to the look and feel of
the warning, like changes pertaining to the warning text, background colors, images
used etc. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the current phishing warnings for Mozilla Firefox
and Google Chrome browsers. In this study, a novel warning mechanism for phishing
attacks is proposed, which is designed to be more effective and intended to help users
make a safe decision when they are made target to an unexpected phishing attack.
In a phishing attack, a malicious website always masquerades as a genuine website,
which is the target website, to fool the unsuspecting user. Typically, when the browser
displays a warning message for a potential phishing attack, it informs the user that
the requested URL has been reported as a potential fake website, designed to fool
unsuspecting internet users. Along with that, there are buttons provided to give users
options of going back or ignoring the message and clicking through. Many times, this
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does not prove to be good enough as some users eventually click through the warning.
Figure 3.1: Mozilla Firefox 34 Phishing Warning Page
In this proposed design, a multi staged, interactive warning mechanism is pro-
posed, which utilizes the information of the target website to increase the users trust
of the warning which can improve the warning effectiveness. But before discussing
more details about that, it is important to discuss some technical and usability related
issues of using the target website information in a browser warning.
3.1 Technical Feasibility
It was discussed earlier how web browsers check every requested URL against cer-
tain blacklists of phishing websites that are maintained by organizations like Google
and Phishtank, and decide if a phishing warning needs to be displayed to the user.
Google maintains its list of blacklisted websites in a hashed format and the only way
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Figure 3.2: Google Chrome 39 Phishing Warning Page
that list could be used was by using its API to check if a particular URL is entered in
their list. However, Phishtank maintains a detailed list in plaintext, with the phishing
URLs and their corresponding target websites, among other information. This data
is available on their website and updated every hour. The target website information
can be very instrumental in designing a very effective warning mechanism against
phishing warning. This is discussed further below.
3.1.1 Implementation Overview
The goal of this study was to design a phishing warning mechanism, built around
the information of the target website of a reported phishing URL. Thus this work does
not focus on the detection of a phishing URL but instead relies on external source
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for the list of previously reported phishing websites. This study however throws light
on certain ways to detect the target information of certain phishing URLs. It is
discussed further in section 3.1.2. In the design proposed in this study, Phishtank’s
data was found to be the most suitable, as they not only provided the reported URLs
in plaintext, but they also maintained the corresponding target names for a portion
of those URLs. This study introduces an add-on for the Mozilla Firefox browser that
can intercept every URL requested by a user and then check this against the blacklist
provided by Phishtank. This add-on performs the task of detecting a target website
and based on that detection, display the new warning message. Here the mechanism
completely relies on Phishtanks data in identifying a phishing URL. If a URL exists
in the list, it is considered a web forgery and the add-on proceeds to display a warning
message for the requested URL. From the Phishtank data, the add-on reads the target
website information for the URL detected as a web forgery and uses that name in
the warning message accordingly. If the URL is not found in the list, it is considered
harmless and no warning message is displayed.
3.1.2 Technical Details
Phishtank provides a database of thousands of reported phishing URLs, with their
corresponding target names. However, it was found in the study that in the Phishtank
data, less than 20% of the reported URLs are mapped to respective (known) targets.
This number changes minutely as the database gets updated every hour. Table 3.1
gives a breakdown of the URLs whose targets have been verified by Phishtank as of
January, 2015. The URLs that are not mapped to any known targets are categorized
as ‘Others’. It is, therefore, highly probable that many URLs requested by a user
will not be mapped to any known target name. For such scenarios, a few measures
are proposed to detect the potential target name that the spoof website is mimicking.
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Table 3.1: Top 10 Targets Identified by Phishtank
Target Overall Percentage Percentage in known targets
Paypal 7.7% 36.78%
Poste Italiane 3.125% 14.9%
AOL 2.44% 11.7%
eBay 1.2% 5.75%
Apple 0.75% 3.57%
Google 0.66% 3.16%
Bradesco 0.48% 2.29%
Allegro 0.41% 1.9%
Capitec Bank 0.31% 1.5%
Orkut, Yahoo 0.245% 1.17%
However, as mentioned earlier, target detection is not the primary objective of this
study. The warning message has been designed to be compatible and usable with any
target detection mechanism.
The following is a discussion on how the target website detection mechanism
proposed in this study works. When a URL is detected as a phishing URL, the add-
on searches for possible target names by looking at the data provided by Phishtank.
If a target is not identified, then the add-on looks for words similar to the Phishtank
identified target names in the URL of the phishing website. In this way, target
identification was done for about 25% of the unidentified URLs. Remaining URLs
did not contain any word that matched any of the targets identified by Phishtank.
Table 3.2 gives a breakdown of the targets that were identified from the URL of the
phishing links categorized under Others category. However, the accuracy of this could
not be calculated due to two problems associated with phishing websites:
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Table 3.2: Breakdown of Targets Identified by Add-on
Target Percentage of Identified URL
Yahoo 19.42%
Google 18.28%
AOL 16%
Windows Live 15.43%
Alibaba 2.86%
Paypal 2.29%
Facebook 2%
• Brief time frame of existence.
Phishing websites are live for a very brief period of time. Once some victims fall
prey to some attack, these websites are quickly taken down, or they are hosted
under different domain names. 500 random URLs were picked from Phishtank’s
list of reported spoof websites and it was found that over 40% of the websites
were no longer available. Table 3.3 gives a breakdown of the top 3 reasons of
these URLs not working, which form about 92% of these URLs that do not
work.
• Multiple targets in the same URL
150 URLs were picked randomly from the phishtank data. Out of these URLs,
89 URLs were found to still work. In 27 of those 89 cases, the URLs targeted
multiple websites. The total number of targets from these 89 links was 174.
Table 3.4 gives a break down of the some of the major websites these URLs
targeted. Because of URLs having multiple targets, the target distribution
cannot be ascertained without manually opening all the URLs in the Phishtank
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Table 3.3: Unavailable URLs Breakdown
Error Message Percentage
Web page no longer available 44.26%
Web page did not load 32.79%
Error 404 14.75%
Table 3.4: Breakdown of Targets with Multi Target URLs
Target Percentage of Identified URL
Google 49.15%
Paypal 10.61%
Guildwars 2 9.67%
Yahoo 7.2%
Apple 6.6%
AOL 5.91%
Dropbox 4.43%
list.
Software security product vendor Kaspersky recently released a report on phishing
attacks detected by their anti-phishing component, in Q2, 2014 Lab (2014). As per
their record, some of the top phishing targets are shown in Table 3.5. These websites
come under Global Portal and Social network sites portal. The report did not provide
any detail on websites dealing with online financial transactions.
As mentioned earlier, about 40% of the sample of 500 random URLs were found to
be inactive. However, it was also noticed that of the URLs that still worked, almost
100% of them had the name of the target website written on the browser tab title.
So the add-on was developed to keep this into account and read the browser tab title
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Table 3.5: Top Phishing Targets by Kaspersky
Target Percentage of Identified URL
Yahoo 30.96%
Google 8.68%
Facebook 8.1%
Live.com 3.72%
Odnoklassniki 2.75%
to get the possible name of the target website. This target information can then be
used in the new warning design as discussed in the next section.
3.1.3 Warning Design
The purpose of the designed add-on, that was discussed earlier, is only to intercept
every requested URL and check if it has been reported as a phishing website, and
if it is, then detect the corresponding target website name. This study proposes a
novel warning message design that uses that target website name to warn the users
of a potential phishing attack. The design keeps into consideration the fact that
the back-end target detection mechanism may or may not be accurate, as it may be
bypassed by an attacker, as a result of which, the target detection may be inaccurate.
If the detection of the target website is correct, the warning message provides the user
the option to navigate to the real and safe target website. Figure 3.3 shows the first
warning page that is displayed to the user once the target is identified. The warning
message eliminates the possibility of a user proceeding to a spoof website if the target
is detected correctly. In case of an incorrect detection of the target website, the
warning provides the user a list of three possible targets to choose from. If the actual
target matches one of those websites suggested, the warning provides way to directly
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Figure 3.3: Proposed Warning Message - Stage 1
navigate to the corresponding real and safe target. Figure 3.4 shows this scenario. If
there is still no match, the warning page gives the user the option to enter as an input,
the name of the target website, and redirects to a Google search page of the target
name provided by the user. The user can decide to choose the real and safe website
from the Google Search page. In this page, the user is also given the option to ignore
the input box and proceed to the potentially harmful website if the user does not want
to waste time while typing into the input box. This scenario can be seen in Figure
3.5. If the user chooses to proceed to the potentially harmful website, the add-on still
keeps track of the users activity on that website. Here the final stage of the warning
mechanism comes into action. After ignoring the warning message and proceeding
to the potentially harmful website, if the user tries to click on any text box, to enter
either user id or password, the add-on will display a small floating passive warning
message, to discourage the user from entering any confidential information into the
website. The user is given the choice to either leave the page or ignore the warning
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Figure 3.4: Proposed Warning Message - Stage 2
permanently (Figure 3.6). On leaving the page, the tab is closed and the user is
protected from a potential theft of confidential information. If the user chooses the
latter, then the warning is no more displayed for that URL and the user is on her
own after that
3.1.4 Limitation
Our warning design suffers from a couple of limitations. First, the navigation to
the real, safe websites of a possible target website is done only to the home page of the
website, even if the user was trying to go to a specific page in the website. This is not
a major limitation as it is possible that the user was tricked into clicking a fake link to
get to some fake page, and a corresponding web-page in the real, safe website may not
even exist. The second limitation is that if the user goes on to enter the name of the
potential target website name by typing into the input box, then the warning page
redirects to a google search page, instead of the website of the organization provided
by the user. Future work can focus on addressing these limitations.
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Figure 3.5: Proposed Warning Message - Stage 3
Figure 3.6: Proposed Warning Message - Stage 4
3.2 Usability Issues
While designing a warning message, it is very important to consider the factor of
usability. A warning message is expected to be easy to read, easy to understand and
should be able to convey the threat associated effectively. In this study, various factors
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that go into making the warning message an effective warning while maintaining high
usability of the warning are considered.
3.2.1 Warning Design
As it was discussed earlier, a target website information is used to inform the user
that she is under a potential phishing attack. On identifying a target, the warning
provides explanation in simple text about the scenario and asks the user to click on
either ‘Yes or ‘No, depending on the accuracy of the target website detection. For a
correct detection of the target information, the warning does not provide any option
to the user to ignore the warning and carry on with the spoof website. Here, the
warning does not decide if the target detection was accurate. It is decided by the
user. If the target displayed by the warning message matches the users requested
website, then the target detection is considered correct. If the detection is incorrect,
the user can click on No to get further options. This takes the warning to the next
stage, where the user is provided three potential target names that the user might
have requested. In choosing the target names in this study, the top three phishing
targets identified by Phishtank other than the target originally identified, are used.
Here, machine learning algorithms can be used to get better target options. In this
study, as discussed earlier, the focus is not on the accuracy of detecting the target
warning, but on using the target information in a warning message. In this stage,
the options provided to the user are very simple, if the target identification was done
correctly, then click on the corresponding button, otherwise click on the Other button.
The latter option will take the warning to the third stage where the user is given the
option to enter the website name in a search box or avoid that and click through to
the potentially spoof website. It is understood that asking a user to type in an input
box in order to get to a website is not desirable from the usability standpoint, but
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to keep a user safe from a phishing website, this is a trade-off. Also, this completely
depends on the accuracy of the target detection technology. If target detection is
accurate, then the third stage of the warning can be totally avoided. The warning
design has been built to work for any type of target detection mechanism.
3.2.2 User Understanding
When designing a warning message, one of the most important considerations is
the user’s understanding of it. It determines how a user is likely to react to the
warning on encountering it habitually. If a user does not understand a warning
message, then there is a potential risk of her getting habituated to ignoring the
message and proceeding with her potentially harmful task. The warning proposed
in this study has been designed considering a user’s understanding with respect to
her desired understanding in mind. Simple, short and easy to understand sentences
were used to make user understand the threat associated with the warning message.
It is extremely important that a user’s understanding of the scenario is correct at
the first stage of the warning, as the rest of the stages rely on that. Table 3.6 gives
an account of the user’s desired response to the first stage of the proposed warning
message based on the her perception of the target website vs the real scenario, in the
example shown by Figure 3.3. If the user was trying to visit www.amazon.com, then
for any scenario, her desired action is click on Yes, as the browser will then redirect
to the real and safe website. If the user was trying to visit some other website, but
the target detection mechanism mistakenly detected the target as Amazon, then the
user’s desired action is No for all scenarios. Here, the first two of the ‘desired action:
click No’ scenarios are harmful situations that arise due to failure of target detecting
technology. The third ‘Click No’ situation is harmless, as a harmless website was
detected as a phishing website.
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Table 3.6: User’s Desired Action Based on Understanding of Warning
````````````````````````
Real Scenario
User’s target perception
amazon.com Not amazon.com
Fake website pretending to be amazon.com Click Yes Click No
Fake, phishing website not pretending to be
amazon.com Click Yes Click No
Harmless website, incorrectly detected as
amazon.com Click Yes Click No
3.2.3 User Trust
Another extremely important factor determining the success or failure of a warn-
ing message in keeping a user safe from a phishing website is her trust on the warning
message. Once the user is able to correctly understand the warning message, her ad-
herence to it depends on her trust on the warning. The proposed warning mechanism
is designed to gain the user’s trust by including the target website information. It is
expected that seeing the desired destination website’s name in the warning will make
the user treat it not as a generalized warning but a specific warning, meant only for
her. This might help in improved trust on the warning mechanism and thus to the
adherence of the warning. With habitual encounter of this warning too, the user is
expected to display adherence to the warning.
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Chapter 4
STUDY AND RESULTS
To understand the effectiveness of the proposed warning message, it has to be run
through several tests. People from different backgrounds,different age-groups and
different levels of computer security knowledge should be subjected to this warning
message and based on their responses and feedback, the warning’s effectiveness can
be ascertained. As a first step to this process, an online survey was conducted among
students of an undergraduate course in the Computer Science department at Arizona
State University (ASU). This was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB)
at ASU with exempt status. Out of the 167 students that were contacted for the
study, 27 students participated. In the survey, some user information, like age, gender,
browser user, number of hours spent on internet every week etc., were collected first.
Of the 27 participants, 5 participants were female and 22 were male. 18 participants
(66.67%) users were in the age group 18 - 24 and 6 participants (22.22%) were in the
age group 25 - 29. Then the users’ feedback on questions related to the proposed
warning message and existing warning messages from Mozilla Firefox and Google
Chrome was collected. The questions have been listed in Appendix A.
4.1 Hypothesis
The effectiveness of the proposed warning is tested against the phishing warnings
of Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome browser. Three parameters were considered for
this: Understanding of the warning, simplicity of the language used and Confidence
in landing to a safe website from the warning. There were six hypotheses tests which
are as follows:
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• Hypothesis 1 (H1): The proposed warning will be easier to understand than the
Mozilla Firefox warning.
• Hypothesis 2 (H2): The proposed warning will be easier to understand than the
Google Chrome warning.
• Hypothesis 3 (H3): The language used in the proposed warning will be simpler
than that used in the Mozilla Firefox warning.
• Hypothesis 4 (H4): The language used in the proposed warning will be simpler
than that used in the Google Chrome warning.
• Hypothesis 5 (H5): The proposed warning will generate more confidence in the
users of landing in a safe website, than the Mozilla Firefox warning.
• Hypothesis 6 (H6): The proposed warning will generate more confidence in the
users of landing in a safe website, than the Mozilla Firefox warning.
All six hypotheses involve testing the first stage of the proposed warning message
as the effectiveness of the warning message depended heavily on the user’s correct
response in the first stage of the warning.
4.2 Results
The responses received from the sample of 27 students did not validate any of
the aforementioned six hypotheses. For all six hypotheses, the null hypothesis could
not be rejected at 5% significance level. The following were the p-values obtained by
conducting a two sample t test for all the six cases:
• H1: p = 0.8769
• H2: p = 0.9777
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• H3: p = 0.3666
• H4: p = 0.751
• H5: p = 0.8379
• H6: p = 0.945
Thus it was not possible to reject any of the null hypotheses that stated that
the proposed warning would be equally effective as the phishing warnings of Mozilla
Firefox or Google Chrome in terms of understanding, simplicity or confidence in
landing the user to a safe page.
From the responses of the user, it was observed that when the first page of the
warning message was displayed to the participants, 19 users (70.37%) indicated that
they would choose the option ‘Close tab by clicking on close tab symbol on the
tab’ and 7 users (25.93%) responded that they would choose to click on ‘Yes’. The
following were some of the feelings expressed by the participants who chose to close
the tab, about the proposed warning design.
• Distrust
• Confusion in understanding
Most users failed to see the proposed warning as a genuine warning message or
were confused by it’s functionality. The most common reason for this was found to
be ‘lack of familiarity’, which was evident from some comments like:
• ‘ There are never warnings that say “click yes to go to the website you want to
go to” unless they’re attacks that really take you to a bad site.’
• ‘ I haven’t used a browser with this error message. Despite the convenience of
clicking ’Yes’ I am again more inclined to just close the tab and find out more.’
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• ‘ If I have seen such a warning message before, I’d be more comfortable. But
with so many fake warning messages and dialogues out there (as seen in some
ransomware, in extreme cases), I’d be suspicious.’
In scenario B, when the participants were displayed warning stage 2 and subse-
quently, stage 3, 3 participants (11.11%) reported that they would enter the correct
website name and search for the real website, but 24 of them (88.89%) decided to close
the tab. This time too, participants expressed distrust in the warning system. How-
ever, in this stage, along with unfamiliarity, participants also expressed concerns on
seeing multiple warning levels, which was also something that they were not familiar
with. This is seen in comments like the following:
• ‘ Because it kept on changing, I would not feel confident in the error message.’
• ‘ Its gone to far nothing I have seen does this.’
• ‘ I have never seen a chain of warnings such as this. I would be concerned
that there is a (remote) chance that these warnings are illegitimate and are
themselves an attempt at something malicious. I would study the email more
closely in another tab and probably end up deleting it.’
• ‘ To the average user, it might seem like an infection in itself. That’s ALOT of
warning boxes to get through.’
However, when participants were briefed about the warning design towards the end
of the study, users showed improved confidence in the warning mechanism. On a scale
from 1 to 10 on how safe the warning system would keep the users from a spoof website
(Question 18, Section 2, Appendix A), the warning got an average of 7.07, with 12 out
of 27 (44.44%) users giving it an 8 or above. Among female participants, this average
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score was 7.6, whereas among male participants, the score was 6.95. Interestingly,
there was a negative correlation between this score and the users’ self reported score on
the knowledge of computer security concepts. The Pearson’s r value was calculated to
be -0.208, i.e. participants who self reported themselves to be more knowledgeable on
computer security concepts showed tendency of awarding a lower score to the warning
design compared to participants with lower self reported score on computer security
concepts. It was also observed that a total of 8 participants (29.63%) reported that the
proposed warning design made them feel more secured compared to other warnings
seen before (Question 15, Section 2, Appendix A). A similar correlation was observed
here too, where Pearson’s r value of -0.234 was observed between participants’ self
reported score on knowledge of computer security concepts and their confidence on
the security provided by the warning design. Future work can look deeper into this
correlation and find out if the warning design can evoke more confidence in internet
users with lesser computer security knowledge.
4.3 Limitations
The user study suffers from the limitation of any survey based user study. It
cannot be accurately stated that users, in real life scenario, would react the same way
when encountering these warnings as standard browser warnings.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Phishing is a continuously growing threat in the cyber world. With the rapid growth
of the Internet user base, phishing attack are getting more rampant. With a growing
attack plane, cyber attackers are constantly targeting unsuspecting internet users,
trying to steal their confidential information. Internet browsers provide a mechanism
of warning users from a potential phishing attack, but these are not always effective.
Inspite of providing a warning message, browsers are sometimes unable to stop users
from falling prey to these attacks.
5.1 Summary
This study proposes a novel phishing warning design that has not been introduced
before. Using the target website information in case of a detected phishing attack
can help improve users’ reaction to phishing warnings. However, the user study
conducted as a first step to test the effectiveness of this new warning design was not
completely successful. The study wasn’t able to elicit a positive response from the
participants. The warning failed to evoke trust in the user, who seemed to consider
the warning message itself to be a part of an attack. Lack of familiarity with this type
of warning message also seemed to be a reason of users’ lack of trust in the warning
design, among other reasons. However, participants expressed improved confidence
in the design once they were briefed about it, which improved their confidence in
it. So, among the particular sample, even though the proposed warning design did
not prove to be more effective than phishing warnings of Mozilla Firefox and Google
Chrome browsers with respect to understanding of the warning message, simplicity of
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language used and confidence in landing on a safe website, it seemed that once users
got familiar with the warning design and trusted its genuineness, the warning could
be an effective tool in safeguarding them from phishing attacks.
5.2 Future Work
The warning can be designed with more text explaining the results of clicking the
‘Yes’ and ‘No’ buttons in the first page. The warning design can be further tested
with people with different background, age group and levels of computer security
knowledge. Also, there can be tests involving habituation of users with this warning
and checking its effectiveness over extended usage. Future study can involve subject-
ing users to this warning under real life scenario. Based on the results of this study,
later studies can be focussed on making the user aware that the warning message is
genuine in the first place, since the ultimate objective is testing the effectiveness of
the warning with the user aware of its genuineness, and then studying their responses
to the different stages of the warning. Another future work can involve studying
different ways of utilizing the target information to develop a warning mechanism,
which may differ from the one proposed in this study. One variation can be a warning
with more explanation of the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ buttons, as mentioned earlier.
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APPENDIX A
SURVEY QUESTIONS
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Section 1:
1. Age Group?
• 18 - 24
• 25 - 29
• 30 - 34
• 35+
2. Gender?
• Female
• Male
• Decline to Answer
3. What is your current Major?
4. What is your highest level of education?
• High School/GED
• Bachelor’s Degree
• Master’s Degree
5. Which internet browser do you use?
6. How many hours in a week do you spend surfing the internet?
Section 2:
Scenario A: Consider the following scenario: You receive an email from ‘Amazon’
with a receipt from the purchase as the image below:
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Figure A.1: Appendix- Amazon Receipt
On clicking Your Orders button, you are taken to a genuine warning page by the
browser.
Warning 1: Assume that this is a genuine warning message displayed by the
browser. Answer following questions accordingly.
Figure A.2: Appendix- Warning 1
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1. What will be your immediate action if you saw Warning 1?
• Click on ‘Why was this page blocked?’ button
• Click on ‘Get me out of here!’ button
• Click on ‘Ignore this warning’ button
• Close the tab by clicking on the close symbol of the tab
• Other
2. Explain in brief.
On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate the warning on the following rating?
3.a. Understanding of the warning (1: Least clear - 10: Most clear)
3.b. Simplicity of the language used (1: Least simple - 10: Most simple)
3.c. Confidence in landing on a safe website from the warning (1: Least confident
- 10: Most confident)
Warning 2: For Scenario A, assume that this is a genuine warning message dis-
played by the browser. Answer following questions accordingly.
Figure A.3: Appendix- Warning 2
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4. What will be your immediate action if you saw Warning 1?
• Click on the ‘Back to Safety’ button
• Click on the ‘visit this infected site’ button
• Close the tab by clicking on the close symbol on the tab
• Other
5. Please explain in brief.
On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate the warning on the following rating?
6.a. Understanding of the warning (1: Least clear - 10: Most clear)
6.b. Simplicity of the language used (1: Least simple - 10: Most simple)
6.c. Confidence in landing on a safe website from the warning (1: Least confident
- 10: Most confident)
Warning 3: For Scenario A, assume that this is a genuine warning message dis-
played by the browser. Answer following questions accordingly.(Please enlarge image
if the text is unreadable.)
Figure A.4: Appendix- Warning 3
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7. What will be your immediate action if you saw Warning 1?
• Click on ‘Yes’
• Click on ‘No’
• Close the tab by clicking on the close symbol on the tab
• Other
8. Please explain in brief.
On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate the warning on the following rating?
9.a. Understanding of the warning (1: Least clear - 10: Most clear)
9.b. Simplicity of the language used (1: Least simple - 10: Most simple)
9.c. Confidence in landing on a safe website from the warning (1: Least confident
- 10: Most confident)
Scenario B: You receive an email from Facebook with information of a new login
system that is being implemented for more safety and security. To avail the new
service, a login link is provided. On clicking the link, you see the following warning
message.
Figure A.5: Appendix- Warning 3
Since you werent trying to visit amazon.com, you clicked on the No button. Then
the warning page changes to the following warning (Warning 3 2):(Please enlarge
image if the text is unreadable.)
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Figure A.6: Appendix- Warning 3 2
In Warning 3 2, shown above, assume that you click on Other since none of the
other options take you to www.facebook.com. Then you see the following warning
page (Warning 3 3):(Please enlarge image if the text is unreadable)
Figure A.7: Appendix- Warning 3 3
10. What will be your reaction when you see this change in the warning message?
• Enter the website name in the text box and click on ‘Submit’
• Click on the ‘Click here’ button
• Close the tab by clicking on the close symbol on the tab
• Other
11. Briefly explain why.
If you chose option #2 for Question #10, please answer Question #12 and #13,
otherwise, please go to the next page.
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You clicked on ‘Click here’ button for Warning 3 3 in Question 10. Thus you
land at the ‘Facebook login page. You proceed to enter your login credentials. But
when you click on the user name or password input box, a pop up warning message
(Warning 3 4) is displayed as displayed below:
Figure A.8: Appendix- Warning 3 4
12. When you encounter the above warning message, what will be your next step
of action?
• Click on ‘Get me out of here’ button
• Click on ‘I understand the risks’ button
• Close the tab by clicking the close symbol of the tab
13. Briefly explain why.
In Scenario B, you encountered a new phishing warning design which is interactive
and works in multiple stages. Warning 3 to 3 3 are displayed in an attempt to stop a
user from proceeding to a potential fake website by identifying the real website that
the user tried to visit and making the user land on the actual website. If the user
still manages to proceed to the spoof website, warning 3 4 tries to warn the user once
again about the dangers of entering any confidential information in the website.
Please share your thoughts on this warning design by answering these following
question:
14. Does the warning system make you believe that you might be under some
cyber attack?
• Yes
• No
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15. Does this new warning system make you feel more secured compared to the
warnings you have seen earlier?
• Yes
• No
16. Did you feel that encountering multiple warning messages had any effect on
your judgment about the possible threats?
• Yes
• No
17. Briefly explain why.
18. On a scale from 1 to 10, how would you rate this warning system on keeping
you safe from a spoof website? (1: Least effective - 10: Most effective)
19. Please explain if you think this warning system is better/worse than the
phishing warnings that you have seen before. (Please answer N/A if you haven’t seen
a phishing warning before.)
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APPENDIX B
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL
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Figure B.1: Appendix- IRB Email Approval
Figure B.2: Appendix- IRB Approval ERA Website
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Figure B.3: Appendix- IRB Approval Correspondence
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